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Abstract
In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a social choice
function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of agents’
private types. The revelation principle asserts that if a social choice function can be
implemented by a mechanism in equilibrium, then there exists a direct mechanism
that can truthfully implement it.
This paper aims to propose a failure of the revelation principle. We point out that
in any game the format of each agent’s strategy is either an informational message
or a realistic action, and the action format is very common in many practical cases.
The main result is that: For any given social choice function, if the mechanism
which implements it has action-format strategies, then “honest and obedient” will
no longer be the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct mechanism, actually the
social choice function can only be implemented “dishonestly and disobediently” in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium by the direct mechanism. Consequently, the revelation
principle fails when the format of each agent’s strategy is an action.
Key words: Mechanism design; Revelation principle.
1 Introduction
In the framework of mechanism design theory [1–3], there are one designer
and some agents labeled as 1, · · · , I. 1 Suppose that the designer would like
to implement a social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for
each possible profile of agents’ types, and each agent’s type is modeled as his
privacy. In order to implement a social choice function in equilibrium, the
Email address: 18621753457@163.com (Haoyang Wu).
1 In this paper, the designer is always denoted as “She”, and the agent is denoted
as “He”.
designer constructs a mechanism which specifies each agent’s feasible strategy
set (i.e., the allowed actions of each agent) and an outcome function (i.e., a
rule for how agents’ actions get turned into a social choice).
The revelation principle is an important theorem in mechanism design theory.
It asserts that if a social choice function can be implemented by a mechanism
in equilibrium, then it is truthfully implementable. So far, there have been
several criticisms on the revelation principle: Bester and Strausz [4] pointed
out that the revelation principle may fail because of imperfect commitment;
Epstein and Peters [5] proposed that the revelation principle fails in situations
where several mechanism designers compete against each other. Kephart and
Conitzer [6] proposed that when reporting truthfully is costless and misreport-
ing is costly, the revelation principle can fail to hold.
Different from these criticisms, this paper aims to propose another failure of
the revelation principle. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyses
two formats of strategy and points out that the action format is very common
in many practical cases. Section 3 proposes the main result, i.e., the revelation
principle fails when each agent’s strategy is action-format. Section 4 draws
conclusions. Notations about mechanism design theory are given in Appendix,
which are cited from Ref [1].
2 Two formats of strategy
Note 1: In any game, the format of each agent’s strategy is either an infor-
mational message or a realistic action. ✷
Although the note looks naive, it is not trivial. The reason why we highlight
the distinction of two formats of strategy is that the revelation principle does
not hold for the case of action-format strategies, as will be discussed deeply
in Section 3. For simplification, in the following discussions we simply assume
that in any game all agents’ strategies are of the same format, i.e., we omit
the case in which some agents’ strategies are message-format and other agents’
strategies are action-format. Next, we will deeply investigate the two formats
of strategy respectively.
2.1 Case 1: Mechanism with message-format strategies
Definition 1: A message-format strategy is represented by an informational
message. The information itself contained in the message is just the strategy,
which does not need to be carried out realistically in the mechanism.
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Practically, only in some restricted cases can each agent’s strategy be de-
scribed as pure information and represented by an informational message. For
example, let us consider a chess game, then each player’s strategy is message-
format, since it is a strategic plan about how to play chess. Similarly, the
strategy in a war simulation game is also message-format, since it contains
military plans of players.
Definition 2: Given a social choice function f , suppose a mechanism Γ =
(S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements it in Bayesian Nash equilibrium with message-
format strategies. To clearly describe the message format, we denote each
agent i’s strategy set Si as Mi, and each strategy function as mi(·) : Θi →
Mi, where Θi is agent i’s type set. The outcome function g(·) is denoted
as gm(·) : M1 × · · · × MI → X, where the parameters are message-format
strategies and X is the set of outcomes. Hence, the mechanism Γ is rewritten
as Γm = (M1, · · · ,MI , gm(·)). The game induced by Γm is denoted as Gm,
which works in a one-stage manner:
Step 1: By using the strategy function mi(·) : Θi → Mi, each agent i with
private type θi sends a message mi(θi) to the designer.
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Step 2: The mechanism Γm yields the outcome gm(m1(θ1), · · · ,mI(θI)).
Here, each agent i’s utility is denoted as ui(gm(m1(θ1), · · · ,mI(θI)), θi).
Definition 3: Suppose the game Gm has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, de-
noted as m∗(·) = (m∗
1
(·), · · · ,m∗
I
(·)), i.e., for all i and all θi ∈ Θi, m̂i ∈ Mi,
Eθ
−i
[ui(gm(m
∗
i
(θi),m
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(gm(m̂i,m
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi].
Consider this equilibrium, there is a compound mapping gm(m
∗(·)) : Θ → X
from agents’ possible types θ̂ = (θ̂1, · · · , θ̂I) ∈ Θ into the outcome gm(m
∗(θ̂)),
which is equal to f(θ̂) for any θ̂ ∈ Θ. Based on the compound mapping, we
construct a direct mechanism Γ̄m = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , gm(m
∗(·))) with message-
format strategies. 3
Definition 4: The direct mechanism Γ̄m induces a one-stage direct game Ḡm,
which works as follows:
Step 1: Each agent i with private type θi individually reports an arbitrary
2 In the following discussions, we denote each agent i’s true type as θi, and his any
possible type as θ̂i ∈ Θi.
3 Although gm(m
∗(θ̂)) = f(θ̂) for any θ̂ ∈ Θ, the outcome function of the con-
structed direct mechanism Γ̄m must be the compound mapping gm(m
∗(·)) : Θ → X
instead of f(·) : Θ → X. The reason is straightforward: if the outcome function
of Γ̄m is simply written as f(·), then Γ̄m will become a naive direct mechanism
(Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , f(·)), which is irrelevant to the mechanism Γm = (M1, · · · ,MI , gm(·))
which implements f in equilibrium. Indeed, the formula gm(m
∗(θ̂)) = f(θ̂) (for
any θ̂ ∈ Θ) is the result of the mechanism Γm, and the naive direct mechanism
(Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , f(·)) cannot implement f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium at all.
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type θ̂i ∈ Θi. Here, each agent i does not need to be “honest”, i.e., θ̂i can be
different from agent i’s private type θi.
Step 2: By using the equilibrium strategy functionsm∗(·) = (m∗
1
(·), · · · ,m∗
I
(·)),
the direct mechanism Γ̄m calculates m
∗(θ̂) = (m∗
1
(θ̂1), · · · ,m
∗
I
(θ̂I)), and then
yields the outcome gm(m
∗(θ̂)).
Note 2: Obviously, the calculated results m∗(θ̂) = (m∗
1
(θ̂1), · · · ,m
∗
I
(θ̂I)) are
pure information, and hence are message-format. Actually, only when each
agent i’s strategy mi(·) is message-format can m
∗(θ̂) be legal parameters of
the outcome function gm(·).
Note 3: By Definition 3, m∗(·) = (m∗
1
(·), · · · ,m∗
I
(·)) is the equilibrium of the
game Gm, thenm
∗
i
(θi) is the optimal choice for each agent i given that all other
agents send m∗
−i
(θ−i). Therefore, in the direct game Ḡm, each agent i will find
truth-telling θ̂i = θi to be the optimal choice given that the others agents tell
the truth θ̂−i = θ−i, and the final outcome will be gm(m
∗(θ)), which is equal
to f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Thus, for the case of message-format strategies, truth-
telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct game Ḡm. Consequently,
the revelation principle holds when each agent’s strategy is message-format. ✷
2.2 Case 2: Mechanism with action-format strategies
Definition 5: An action-format strategy is represented by a realistic action,
which should be performed practically.
In many common cases each agent’s strategy must be described as a realistic
action instead of an informational message. For example, let us consider a
tennis game, then each player’s strategy is his realistic action of playing tennis,
but not any imaginary plan about how to play tennis. Compared with the
message-format strategy in a war simulation game, the strategy in a real war
is action-format, since it contains military actions of armies.
Definition 6: Given a social choice function f , suppose a mechanism Γ =
(S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements it in Bayesian Nash equilibrium with action-
format strategies. To clearly describe the action format, we denote each agent
i’s strategy set Si as Ai, and each strategy function as ai(·) : Θi → Ai. The
outcome function g(·) is denoted as ga(·) : A1 × · · · × AI → X, where the
parameters are action-format strategies. Hence, the mechanism Γ is rewritten
as Γa = (A1, · · · , AI , ga(·)). The game induced by Γa is denoted as Ga, which
works in a one-stage manner:
Step 1: By using the action-format strategy function ai(·) : Θi → Ai, each
agent i with private type θi performs the action-format strategy ai(θi).
4
4 For the case of action-format strategies, the designer observes the performance
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Step 2: The mechanism Γa yields the outcome ga(a1(θ1), · · · , aI(θI)).
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Here, each agent i’s utility is denoted as ui(ga(a1(θ1), · · · , aI(θI)), θi).
Definition 7: Suppose the game Ga has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium a
∗(·) =
(a∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·)), i.e., for all i and all θi ∈ Θi, âi ∈ Ai,
Eθ
−i
[ui(ga(a
∗
i
(θi), a
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(ga(âi, a
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi].
Consider this equilibrium, there is a compound mapping ga(a
∗(·)) : Θ → X
from agents’ possible types θ̂ = (θ̂1, · · · , θ̂I) ∈ Θ into the outcome ga(a
∗(θ̂)),
which is equal to f(θ̂) for any θ̂ ∈ Θ. Based on the compound mapping, we
construct a direct mechanism Γ̄a = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , ga(a
∗(·))) with action-format
strategies.
Definition 8: According to Myerson [2], the direct mechanism Γ̄a induces a
multistage direct game Ḡa, which works as follows:
Step 1: Each agent i with private type θi individually reports an arbitrary
type θ̂i ∈ Θi. Here each agent does not need to be “honest”, i.e., θ̂i can be
different from θi.
Step 2: The direct mechanism Γ̄a returns a suggestion to each agent i, here
the suggestion is just a message-format description of action a∗
i
(θ̂i) ∈ Ai. In
order to emphasize the format of the suggestion is a message, we denote the
suggestion as am
i
(θ̂i);
Step 3: Each agent i individually performs an action âi ∈ Ai. Here each agent
i does not need to be “obedient”, i.e., âi can be different from a
m
i
(θ̂i).
Step 4: After observing all actions â1, · · · , âI have been performed, the direct
mechanism Γ̄a yields the outcome ga(â1, · · · , âI).
Here, each agent i’s utility is denoted as ui(ga(â1, · · · , âI), θi).
Note 4: Generally speaking, each agent’s private type is his privacy and is
valuable to him. Consider Step 1 in Definition 8, each agent i reports an
arbitrary type either honestly or dishonestly. Note that choosing to be honest
or dishonest is each agent’s independent and private choice, which cannot be
controlled by the designer. From each agent’s perspective, if the utility of truth-
telling is not strictly larger than the utility of false-telling, then any reasonable
agent will certainly prefer false-telling, because false-telling always hides his
privacy. ✷
Note 5: Consider Step 3 in Definition 8, each agent performs an action after
receiving a suggestion, either obediently or disobediently. Note that choosing
to be obedient or disobedient is each agent’s independent and open choice,
of each agent’s action. As a comparison, for the case of message-format strategies,
the designer receives each agent’s message.
5 If in the mechanism Γa some agent i only declares a message about how to perform
an action but does not realistically perform it, then this declaration is meaningless.
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which cannot be controlled by the designer. Since the designer is not a dictator
in the framework of mechanism design theory, she has no power to punish any
disobedient agent. Obviously, each agent will choose the choice which yields
the higher utility. ✷
3 Main results
Consider the multistage direct game Ḡa induced by the direct mechanism Γ̄a
described in Definition 8. According to Myerson [2], the strategy “honest and
obedient” is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game Ḡa: i.e., each agent i
not only honestly discloses his private type in Step 1 (i.e., θ̂i = θi), but also
obeys the suggestion in Step 3 (i.e., âi = a
m
i
(θi)). However, in this section
we will point out that Myerson’s conclusion will not hold when each agent’s
strategy is of an action format.
Proposition 1: For any given social choice function f(·) : Θ → X, suppose
there is a mechanism that implements it in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and
each agent’s strategy is of an action format. Then f will not be truthfully im-
plementable, i.e., in the multistage direct game induced by the corresponding
direct mechanism, “honest and obedient” will no longer be the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose a mechanism Γa = (A1, · · · , AI , ga(·)) implements the social
choice function f(·) : Θ → X in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and the format
of each agent’s strategy is an action. By Definition 6 it induces a one-stage
game Ga, the equilibrium of which is denoted as a
∗(·) = (a∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·)),
and the outcome ga(a
∗(θ)) = f(θ) for any θ ∈ Θ. By Definition 7 and 8,
there is a corresponding direct mechanism Γ̄a = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , ga(a
∗(·))) and a
multistage direct game Ḡa. In the direct game Ḡa, each agent i with private
type θi independently makes two decisions: in Step 1 he chooses to be “honest”
or “dishonest”, and in Step 3 he chooses to be “obedient” or “disobedient”.
For any agent i, if all other agents 1, · · · , i−1, i+1, · · · , I choose to be “honest”
(i.e., θ̂−i = θ−i), in the following discussions we investigate which choice agent
i should choose in Step 1 of Ḡa, either “honest” or “dishonest”.
Case 1: Suppose agent i chooses to be “honest” in Step 1 of Ḡa, i.e., θ̂i = θi.
Then in Step 2 of Ḡa, the suggestion to agent i will be a
m
i
(θi), and the sugges-
tions to the rest agents will be am
−i
(θ−i). Since the Bayesian Nash equilibrium
strategy of Ga is a
∗(·) = (a∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·)), then in Step 3 of Ḡa, choosing to
be “obedient” (i.e., âi = a
∗
i
(θi)) will be the optimal choice of agent i if all
other agents choose to be “obedient” (i.e., â−i = a
∗
−i
(θ−i)). In Step 4 of Ḡa,
the direct mechanism Γ̄a will yield the outcome ga(a
∗(θ)), which is equal to
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f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Case 2: Suppose in Step 1 of Ḡa, agent i wants to hide his privacy and chooses
to be “dishonest”, i.e., θ̂i ̸= θi. Obviously, in Step 2 of Ḡa, the suggestion to
agent i will be am
i
(θ̂i) ̸= a
m
i
(θi), and the suggestions to the others will still
be am
−i
(θ−i). Therefore, if all other agents choose “obedient” (i.e., performing
â−i = a
∗
−i
(θ−i)), then the optimal choice of agent i in Step 3 of Ḡa should
be “disobedient” (i.e., not obeying the suggestion am
i
(θ̂i) but still performing
âi = a
∗
i
(θi)). Although the designer can find the agent i is disobedient in Step
4 of Ḡa, she cannot punish him according to Note 5. Consequently, in Step 4
of Ḡa, the direct mechanism Γ̄a will still yield the outcome ga(a
∗(θ)), which is
equal to f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
It should be emphasized that although in Case 2 the agent i chooses to be “dis-
obedient” in Step 3 of Ḡa, what he really performs is still consistent with his
private type, i.e., âi = a
∗
i
(θi), the same as what agent i performs in Case 1. As
a result, the social choice function f(·) is still implemented in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium by the constructed direct mechanism Γ̄a = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , ga(a
∗(·))).
From agent i’s perspective, his privacy is disclosed in Case 1 and hidden in
Case 2. Thus, Case 2 will be strictly better than Case 1, because agent i can
obtain the same outcome ga(a
∗(θ)) in the two cases but protects his privacy
in Case 2. Consequently, “honest and obedient” will no longer be the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of the direct mechanism. Furthermore, since Case 2 holds
for any agent i, it can be generalized to every agent as follows.
Case 3: Suppose each agent i with private type θi chooses to be “dishonest”
in Step 1 of Ḡa (i.e. reporting a false type θ̂i ̸= θi), and then chooses to
be “disobedient” in Step 3 of Ḡa, i.e., not obeying the designer’s suggestion
am
i
(θ̂i) but still performing the action âi = a
∗
i
(θi) which is consistent with his
private type. Since the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy of Ga is a
∗(·) =
(a∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·)), then the final outcome of Ḡa will still be ga(a
∗(θ)), which
is equal to f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Put differently, f(·) is implemented by the
constructed direct mechanism Γ̄a = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , ga(a
∗(·))) in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, not truthfully, but dishonestly and disobediently.
Compared with Case 1, in Case 3 each agent obtains the same outcome
ga(a
∗(θ)) and at the same time protects his privacy. Therefore, “dishonest
and disobedient” will be strictly better than “honest and obedient” from each
agent’s perspective.
To sum up, when the format of each agent’s strategy is an action, “dishonest
and disobedient” instead of “honest and obedient” will be the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the direct mechanism Γ̄a = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , ga(a
∗(·))), which means
the revelation principle does not hold. ✷
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4 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose that in any game there are two formats of strategy
(i.e., an informational message or a realistic action), and the action format
is very common in many practical cases. In Section 2.1 we point out that
the revelation principle holds when the format of each agent’s strategy is a
message. However, when the format of each agent’s strategy is an action,
“honest and obedient” will no longer be the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
direct mechanism, actually the social choice function can only be implemented
“dishonestly and disobediently” in Bayesian Nash equilibrium by the direct
mechanism. Therefore, the revelation principle fails when each agent’s strategy
is of action format.
Appendix: Notations and Definitions [1]
Let us consider a setting with one designer and I agents indexed by i =
1, · · · , I. Each agent i privately observes his type θi that determines his pref-
erence over elements in an outcome set X. The set of possible types for agent
i is denoted as Θi. The vector of agents’ types θ = (θ1, · · · , θI) is drawn from
set Θ = Θ1 × · · · × ΘI according to probability density φ(·), and each agent
i’s utility function over the outcome x ∈ X given his type θi is ui(x, θi) ∈ R.
Definition 23.B.1 A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : Θ1×· · ·×
ΘI → X that, for each possible profile of the agents’ types θ1, · · · , θI , assigns
a collective choice f(θ1, · · · , θI) ∈ X.
Definition 23.B.3 A mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) is a collection of I
strategy sets S1, · · · , SI and an outcome function g : S1 × · · · × SI → X.
The mechanism combined with possible types (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI), the probability
density φ(·) over the possible realizations of θ ∈ Θ1 × · · · × ΘI , and utility
functions (u1, · · · , uI) defines a Bayesian game of incomplete information. The
strategy function of each agent i in the game induced by Γ is a private function
si(θi) : Θi → Si. Each strategy set Si contains agent i’s possible strategies.
The outcome function g(·) describes the rule for how agents’ strategies get
turned into a social choice.
Definition 23.B.5 A direct mechanism is a mechanism Γ̄ = (S̄1, · · · , S̄I , ḡ(·))
in which S̄i = Θi for all i and ḡ(θ) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
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6 The bar symbol is used to distinguish the direct mechanism from the indirect
mechanism.
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Definition 23.D.1 A strategy profile s∗(·) = (s∗
1
(·), · · · , s∗
I
(·)) is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) if, for all i and all θi ∈
Θi, ŝi ∈ Si, there exists
Eθ
−i
[ui(g(s
∗
i
(θi), s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(g(ŝi, s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi].
Definition 23.D.2 The mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements the
social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of Γ, s∗(·) = (s∗
1
(·), · · · , s∗
I
(·)), such that g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for
all θ ∈ Θ.
Definition 23.D.3 The social choice function f(·) is truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (or Bayesian incentive compatible) if s̄∗
i
(θi) = θi
(for all θi ∈ Θi and i = 1, · · · , I) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct
mechanism Γ̄ = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , f(·)). That is, if for all i = 1, · · · , I and all
θi ∈ Θi, θ̂i ∈ Θi,
Eθ
−i
[ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(f(θ̂i, θ−i), θi)|θi].
Proposition 23.D.1: (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash Equilib-
rium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) that im-
plements the social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
f(·) is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
References
[1] A. Mas-Colell, M.D. Whinston and J.R. Green, Microeconomic Theory. Oxford
University Press, 1995.
[2] R. Myerson, Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent
problems. Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol.10, 67-81, 1982.
[3] Y. Narahari et al, Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and
Mechanism Design Solutions. Springer, 2009.
[4] H. Bester and R. Strausz, Contracting with imperfect commitment and the
revelation principle: The single agent case. Econometrica, Vol.69, No.4, 1077-
1098, 2001.
[5] Epstein and Peters, A revelation principle for competing mechanisms. Journal
of Economic Theory, 88, 119-160 (1999).
[6] A. Kephart and V. Conitzer, The revelation principle for mechanism design with
reporting cost. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
(EC), Maastricht, The Netherlands, 2016.
9
